A Look at the Russian National Strategy (pt. II)

Note: Points bolded for ease of skimming through the text for the general idea. The concept of the 'multi-polar world', of which Russia is a staunch advocate, is inherently prone to conflicts. It turns the world into an arena of rivalry between the various players, and that rivalry may also include the use of force. The numerous 'poles' in such a multi-polar world will inevitably become rivals, and try to create their own spheres of influence in their respective regions. Naturally, given Russia's military and industrial capability, its long imperialist tradition, and its unique geopolitical situation at the heart of Eurasia, Russia is in a better position than many other nations to become one of the world's greatest powers. That is why the Russian elite believes that a multi-polar world and the concomitant geopolitical chaos would be in Russia's best interests, and open up great opportunities for furthering Russian interests. At the same time, Russia cannot ignore its numerous links with the Western countries, let alone enter into a state of ideological confrontation with the West. Russia is facing the same modern challenges as the rest of the world, including terrorism and separatism. Russia wants to make sure that there are no threats to its own security emanating from the territory of former Soviet republics. Finally, Moscow is also forced to take into account the rise of the new great powers on the global arena, especially China. The country needs to be prepared for a broad range of threats. The combination of these factors is compelling Russia to pursue a multi-pronged strategy. The key goals of the Russian strategy can be outlined as follows: - Putting military-political pressure on the domestic and foreign policy of the former Soviet republics, and using military force against these republics, if such force is required to protect Russian national interests - Military deterrence of the US and the NATO countries, with the primary goal of preventing any Western meddling in conflicts in the former Soviet republics or Western attempts to forestall possible Russian actions with regard to these republics - Participation in countering internal threats such as separatism and terrorism. As naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan put it in The Problem of Asia and Its Effect Upon International Policies (1900), Russia's "irremediable remoteness from an open sea has helped put it in a disadvantageous position for the accumulation of wealth." Russia's search for warm-water ports has always been somewhat fanciful, though. Far more important is Ukraine. Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor to former American president Jimmy Carter, wrote in The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (1997), "Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire." It could still be an imperial state - "but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians," if not China. Take Ukraine, on the other hand, and "Russia automatically again regains the wherewithal to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia." It raises its population by a third, gives it agricultural lands as well as access to coal and other natural resources, particularly in the Donbas region, and denies European powers energy security. It was through Ukraine that the Nazis accessed the oil fields of the Caucasus and it is through pipelines in Ukraine that half of Russia's natural gas exports to Russia flow west. Moreover, possession of the Crimean Peninsula and the port of Odessa enables Russia to project power into the Black Sea and from there, the Mediterranean. Hence the Soviets were quick to assert themselves in Ukraine after the 1917 revolution and hence Vladimir Putin's annexation of the Crimea in 2014 and his government's support for a separatist uprising in the Donbas. Further south, Russia must command the Caucasus as a fortress against the political and religious dangers of the Middle East. Although the people there are the Russians' cultural and political inferiors and too divided among themselves to defend the area, they - like all mountain folk - are also fiercely independent and unlikely to ever fully submit to Russian rule. Once the Soviet Union collapsed, and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia declared their independence, it set off unrest in Russia's North Caucasus as well. The priority at the time was pacifying Chechnya. Next, the Russians took to weakening the most pro-Western republic, Georgia, by having Abkhazia and South Ossetia break away from it . Georgia matters because it could give the West a foothold on the eastern shore of the Black Sea and an alternative route for energy supplies. Russia's absorption of Abkhazia in 2014 made the first prospect less likely. The second hinges on Azerbaijan which Brzezinski described, rather fancifully, as "the cork in the bottle containing the riches of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia." Besides its own plentiful oil and natural gas reserves, Azerbaijan can transport hydrocarbons from Central Asia through Georgia and Turkey into Europe and thus threaten Russia's gas monopoly. In Central Asia, Uzbekistan is a pivotal state. However, Uzbekistan is landlocked and would need the help of Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan to transport its wealth across the Caspian Sea or into China. For Russia, Kazakhstan, by far the largest state in the region and the wealthiest in natural resources, is the real prize. Situated on the Caspian Sea and hosting pipelines running east as well, it is indispensable if Russia is to secure preponderance in Central Asia. Halford J. Mackinder, a British geographer and pioneer in the study of geopolitics, famously identified Central Asia as Eurasia's "Heartland," the pivot on which the fate of empires rests. Not because Central Asia itself is of such overwhelming economic or strategic importance, rather because whoever controls it tends to dominate Eurasian affairs - and global affairs by extension. There are three more independent states that frustrate Russian security in the south . Neither the tsars nor the Soviets quite managed to subdue either, let alone all, of them. Coming down from the Caucasus, Imperial Russia was able to overpower Iran in the late nineteenth century but only for a few decades and only in league with the British. The reason for seeking access to Iran is straightforward: it barrs Russia from the Persian Gulf. Russia has another reason for maintaining close relations with today's Iran. Its millenarian regime could foment religious strife in Russia's Muslim-populated south. Turkey similarly checks Russia's ambitions in the Black Sea and the Caucasus. It can deny Russia access to the Mediterranean Sea but will only feel strong enough to do so when it is backed by a powerful Western ally. Hence British support for the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century and America's extension of NATO membership to Turkey in the twentieth. Russia must seek to weaken that link if it is to have unimpeded access to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Brzezinski predicted that Turkey's future orientation would be decisive for the region. " If Turkey sustains its path to Europe - and if Europe does not close its door to Turkey - the states of the Caucasus are also likely to gravitate into the European orbit, a prospect they fervently desire. But if Turkey's Europeanization grinds to a halt, for either internal or external reasons, then Georgia and Armenia will have no choice but to adapt to Russia's inclinations. " Russian overtures to Ankara, in the form of energy diplomacy, appear to be conspiring with the country's own cultural retrogression and Europe's wariness about admitting Turkey to the European Union to bring that second prediction about. Finally, Russia requires the acquiescence of Greece to fully project its power into the Mediterranean and beyond. Mackinder warned, "Possession of Greece by a great Heartland power would probably carry with it the control of the World-Island." If it subordinates Turkey, Russia could still be blocked by an oceanic power in the Aegean Sea. Once Greece succumbs to its influence too, the Mediterranean will be wide open. Sources http://ift.tt/1It1ZBt http://ift.tt/1HI06mh



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